University of Richmond

UR Scholarship Repository
Management Faculty Publications

Management

1991

Strategic Competitiveness in the 1990s: Challenges and
Opportunities for U.S. Executives
Michael A. Hitt
Robert E. Hoskisson
Jeffrey S. Harrison
University of Richmond, harrison@richmond.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/management-faculty-publications
Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons

Recommended Citation
Hitt, Michael A., Robert E. Hoskisson and Jeffrey S. Harrison. "Strategic Competitiveness in the 1990s:
Challenges and Opportunities for the U.S. Executives." The Academy of Management Journal 5, no. 2
(February 1991): 7-22. https://doi.org/10.5465/ame.1991.4274663

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Management at UR Scholarship Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Management Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

l Academy of Management Executive, 1991 Vol. 5 No. 2
.............................................................................................................................................................................

Strategic competitiveness in
the 1990s: challenges and
opportunities for
U.S. executives
Michael A. Hitt, Texas A & M University
Robert E. Hoskisson, Texas A & M University

Jeffrey S. Harrison, Clemson University

Executive Overview U.S. firms face a major global competitiveness challenge. Although the

problems relate, in part, to differences in the economic structure, history and
cultural differences between the U.S. and foreign rivals, these factors may not
explain as much of the variance in competitiveness as they did in the past.
Competitiveness problems are also linked to a number of strategic factors under
the control of managers. Among them are the absorption of managerial energy
in mergers and acquisitions, increasing levels of debt, increasing firm size,
greater firm diversification, lack of investment in human capital and
inappropriate corporate culture.

In response to these problems, many firms are restructuring. When executed
properly, restructuring can help managers regain strategic control and improve
the competitiveness of their companies. However, restructuring efforts must be
accompanied by a renewed emphasis on competitive strengths. improvements in
human resource development programs, a refocus on innovation and quality,
promotion of an entrepreneurial culture and a global, long-term strategy.
.....................................................................
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Article

In 1964 Xerox introduced the first commercial fax machine but in 1989 had only
seven percent of U.S. fax sales. Japanese firms accounted for 67 percent of the
U.S. fax market. Raytheon marketed the first microwave oven (called
Radarange) to restaurants in 1947 and sales boomed when it introduced the
household version in 1967. Today, 75 percent of the microwaves sold in the U.S.
market are made in Pacific Rim countries. During the decade of the 1980s,
American auto manufacturers closed 13 assembly plants while Japanese firms
built 11 new auto manufacturing plants in the United States. Leo McKernan,
CEO of Clark Equipment stated, "In the 1980s LBOs, takeovers and global
competition left a path of destruction out there. Now somebody is going to have
to fix it."'
Most executives agree that U.S. firms face a global, competitive challenge of
immense proportions. In a recent survey of 4,000 executives, 92 percent noted that
U.S. competitiveness was declining and 87 percent believed that the
competitiveness problem predated the 1980s. A concurrent survey of opinion
leaders (e.g., economists, political leaders, CEOs of large corporations) led to the
same conclusions.2

Competitiveness problems are not limited to trade with Japan. According to a 1987

report by the Council on Competitiveness, the United States hats not fared well in
comparison to Canadax, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, West Germany, or
7
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Japan. Each of these countries outperformed the U.S. in gains in standard of
living, trade, productivity, and investment since 1974.3 Another study traced the
world market share of firms in fifteen major industries. The U.S. held over
two-thirds of the world market in 10 of these industries in 1960, dominated 9 in
1970, and led in only 3 industries (aerospace, paper, and computers and office
equipment) by 1980.4
Differences in the cost of labor and the cost of capital are usually blamed for the
decline of U.S. competitiveness. In this article, we argue that many of the
competitive advantages previously attributed to Japan are either not as strong as
perceived or have faded. This article also extends previous arguments on U.S.
competitiveness problems by examining issues of strategic competitiveness; that is,
strategic issues affecting firms that are under managers' direct or indirect control.
Finally, we offer recommendations for potential solutions.

Explanations of Competitiveness Problems
Despite general consensus that the competitiveness of U.S. firms has declined,
there is little agreement as to the causes. The model in Exhibit 1 separates
strategic competitiveness explanations (those areas that managers might influence)
from explanations focusing on differences in economic structure, and historical
and cultural differences. We briefly review economic structure, historical and
cultural influences on competitiveness (gray arrows) and demonstrate that some of
these forces may not be as strong as they have been in the past. Regardless of
their strength, managers can do little to alter these forces. Therefore, we focus
most of our attention on competitiveness factors that are directly or indirectly
under managerial control (solid arrows).
Economic Structure Differences
While still high, U.S. productivity has grown at a much slower rate during the
past 25 years than other advanced industrial countries. For example, between
1970 and 1986, U.S. productivity rose at an average annual rate of 2.9 percent.
This compares to Great Britain's 3.4 percent, 3.8 percent in Germany, 4.2 percent
in France, and 6.0 percent in Japan. If we use 1950 as a base of 100, by 1988 U.S.

productivity had grown to about 200, West Germany to 650, and Japan to 2000.5
It has been suggested that the disparity between U.S. and foreign productivity is
directly related to educational system differences, the cost of labor, and the cost of

ECONOMIC STRUCTURE DIFFERENCES

- Poor Educational Systemr

- Hih Cost ol Labor

- High Cost of Capital
Low Savings Rate

High Levels ol Foreign Investment in U.S

STRATEGIC COMPETITIVENESS REGAINING STRATEGIC CONTROL

FACTORS U.S. COMPETITIVENESS OUTCOMES FOR COMPETMVENESS

-Hirgh
Increasing
Mergers and Acqstshlons Hig Trade DecO ownsoping
Llnb of Deb - InduTrie Denektbpmert ol Human Capital
- Increesintg Size - D ining Industreneswed Emphasis on R&D

Increasing Diversicelion - Slow ProductivOy Growth _ - Eft

-Low Investm orits in Human Capital -Endr preneurial Spirit
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Corporate
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- Rebuilding Processes Alter World War 11
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Exhibit 1. Causes and Competiveness Consequences
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capital. Associated with these problems are the low savings rate and increases in
foreign investment in the United States.

For example, a Poor Educational System. It is estimated that approximately 20 percent of adult
company built a new Americans are functionally illiterate and that over 25 percent of our high school
plant with students do not graduate. The effects of this problem are dramatic. For example, a
computer-integrated company built a new plant with computer-integrated manufacturing and statistical

manufacturing and process controls but the emploIees could not operate the equipment beca

statistical process percent of them were illiterate. It has also been argued that U.S. high school

controls but the students' math skills are lower than foreign students'. On the other hand

controls bout tne argued that the U.S. educational system promotes greater creativity. H

employees could not U.S. businesses have failed to capitalize on this comparative advantage.
Operate the equipment

because 25 percent of Managers have little direct control over the basic educational system, although
them were illiterate. they certainly can lobby national and local governments for educational reform.
Managers also rarely have much control over other structural issues, such as the

cost of labor and the cost of capital.
High Cost of Labor. The cost of labor is often described as a structural problem in
comparison to other nations, especially those in the Pacific Rim. Although this
may continue to be the case for developing countries such as Taiwan and Korea,
labor costs of Japan are reaching parity with the United States. The Bureau of
Labor Statistics recently reported that the average cost per hour of wages in 1988
was $13.90 in the U.S. compared to $13.14 in Japan. Therefore, low wages no
longer provide the Japanese with a distinct competitive edge. Although salaries of
American top executives are substantially higher than their Japanese
counterparts, compensation of middle managers in Japan are higher (median
compensation of middle managers: Japan $85,649; U.S.-$56,505).7
High labor costs do not automatically produce a competitive disadvantage. Some
U.S. firms (e.g., Lincoln Electric) use reward systems characterized by generous
employee compensation to produce high efficiency, quality, and innovation. In
fact, the cost of labor is often less than fifteen percent of total product costs.

High Cost of Capital/Low Savings Rate. Experts argue that U.S. firms must
improve their capital investment, emphasizing automation (thereby reducing labor
costs). Furthermore, this change is necessary if U.S. firms are to match foreign
competitors' productivity growth. It is often suggested that the high cost of capital
in the United States discourages investment in capital equipment.

High labor costs do Recent evidence suggests that major inputs affecting the cost of capital may be
not automatically closer between Japan and the U.S. than previously acknowledged. In a recent
produce a competitive Wallstreet Journal article, Kenichi Ohmae argued that, due to measurement
disad vantage. errors, previous differences in savings rate comparisons of Japanese (16.6 percent
and Americans (4.3 percent) may not be accurate. Using Ohmae's adjustments,
plus adjusting for comparable asset bases, the Bank of Japan estimated the U.S.
savings rate as 14.7 percent and the Japanese as 16.7 percent. The standard U.S.

rate has been increasing.8 This suggests that the cost of capital in both countries

may be closer than earlier estimates showed.

These arguments suggest that although structural differences may continue to
explain some variance in competitiveness, they may not be as salient as they once
were.

Historical/Cultural Influences
The decline of U.S. competitiveness also has been linked to historical trends in the
global economy and to cultural differences across country borders.
9
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Rebuilding Processes. Relatively low productivity gains of American firms are
often attributed to post-World War II rebuilding processes in Germany and Japan.
The economic infrastructure of these countries was decimated during World War
II, but post-war rebuilding processes allowed newer and more productive plants
and equipment to replace destroyed assets. More than four decades have now
passed since the end of World War II. While Germany and Japan may have had a
head start in acquiring updated plants and machinery, this advantage has
diminished with time and probably accounts for very little new productivity
growth.
Homogeneous National Cultures. It is often suggested that the homogeneity and
work ethic associated with Japanese culture have strongly contributed to the
competitiveness of Japanese firms. However, management practices associated
with Japanese culture are changing with continued industrial growth. The ideals
of lifetime employment, a seniority-based wage system, and consensus decision
making are undergoing significant changes.

However,
management practices
associated with

Japanese culture are
changing with
continued industrial
growth. The ideals of
lifetime employment,
a seniority-based
wage system, and
consensus decision
making are
undergoing significant
changes.

Japanese firms can no longer compete on the basis of production efficiencies

alone. They are facing competition from other low cost producers in South Korea
and Taiwan. This is forcing them to move into markets that are incompatible with
traditional Japanese culture and educational systems. Although it may seem that
the Japanese produce high technology products, their system is stressed by having
to move from producing micro computers to making super computers. They are
confronting similar problems in aerospace and communications where high
creativity is required. They appear to be more effective in developing
manufacturing processes for technology developed by others. However, Korea
and Taiwan also have this expertise. Also, historical incentives no longer have the
same motivational value for a new Japanese generation that is less willing to
conform rigidly to traditional social norms. These trends are creating greater
similarities between American and Japanese cultures.

Organizational attributes such as structure, rules, and procedures are similar
among organizations in different national cultures, particularly in industrialized
nations. Over the long term, these changes are likely to lessen cultural effects on
competitiveness. Although some behavioral differences are likely to persist

because of culture, firm and economic characteristics are likely to converge.9
Declining Resource Base. The belief that scarce resources are causing a decline in
the growth rate of the global economy has created a more hostile environment.
This is especially true for mature basic manufacturing industries such as steel, tire
and rubber, auto, and home appliances. According to Michael Porter, "the
environment in most of the developed world is one of relatively slow growth

coupled with growing global competition. 10 Increasing competition, however, has
not necessarily placed the United States at a disadvantage. Instead, an
increasingly competitive environment may have accelerated changes that were
occurring because of other factors.

Strategic Competitiveness
Although the above factors affect competitiveness, they no longer explain as much
of the variance in competitiveness as they may have in the past. The good news
for U.S. managers is that the remaining strategic factors, most critical to relative
competitiveness, are under their control. Strategic competitiveness relates to
critical strategic decisions by which managers can affect firm competitiveness.
The most important source of the decline in strategic competitiveness is poor

development of new product and process technologies relative to other countries.
For instance, the U.S. remains the leader in central processing chips, but the
Japanese have overtaken America in memory chips. While central processing
10
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chips provide the main core of the computer, memory chips represent the bulk of
sales.

Another indication of this problem is U.S. firms' absence in the consumer
electronics market. In the late 1960s, there were as many as 18 American
television sets manufacturers. Today, Zenith Electronics Corporation remains the
only producer. Most of the top U.S. brands (e.g., RCA, G.E., Magnavox) are made

by Japanese and European firms. Furthermore, the U.S. is expected to play little
or no role in the development of high definition TV a technological advance
likened in significance to the development of jet propelled airplanes.
Multiple reasons exist for this erosion. First, U.S. industry has been slow to
translate new technology into commercial success. Second, manufacturing is less
emphasized in the U.S. relative to other industrialized countries. Third, fewer
resources are being invested in research and development and technology
transfer than by international competitors. For example, in the United States we
spend approximately 1.8 percent of our GNP on R&D whereas West Germans

spend 2.6 percent and the Japanese spend 2.8 percent. 1 ' Furthermore, U.S. firms
spend half as much of their R&D budgets on process technologies compared to the
Japanese. Japanese firms also spend twice as much on tooling and manufacturing
equipment. This problem is exemplified in the global steel industry. While U.S.
firms such as Inland Steel and USX have made considerable investments to
modernize manufacturing processes, Nippon Steel Company spends about $200
million annually on research-an amount larger than that spent on research by
the entire U.S. steel industry.'2 It is not surprising that U.S. patent numbers are
declining. 13
A recent study showed that R&D intensity (company-sponsored research and
development expenditures divided by sales) was the principal indicator of sales
growth relative to international competitors for firms in fifteen global industries
from 1960 to 1986. 14

.............................................................................................................................................................................

Compounding the problem, as competitive pressures increase, U.S. firms often
reduce R&D expenditures and focus on short-term profits. These actions suggest
that U.S. executives are unwilling to accept the long-term risks of innovation
because of the uncertainty of commercial success. Most R&D investment in the
United States is concentrated in large firms. For example, more than 85 percent
of R&D expenditures are made in firms with over 10,000 employees.'5 This makes
the problem worse as large U.S. firms, in response to economic structure

differences, historical trends, and hostile competition, are likely to reduce the
resources allocated to R&D-the area that would aid recovery in the long term.
Sources of Declining Strategic Competitiveness

The principal reasons for U.S. managers' continued lack of commitment to

innovation may include the absorption of managerial energy in mergers and
acquisitions, higher levels of debt among U.S. firms, increasing size, increasing
diversification, lack of investment in human capital, and weak or inappropriate
corporate cultures. These problems suggest the need to restructure large

diversified firms.

Managerial Energy Absorption in Mergers and Acquisitions. Acquisitive growth
was so popular during the 1980s that the period was labelled the decade of
"merger mania". Thousands of mergers and acquisitions were completed annually
which required significant managerial attention and energy. Significant
preparations and negotiations often precede the completion of acquisitions.

Executives must review data, select acquisition targets, formulate a strategy, and
I1
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conduct negotiations, which all require significant time. Upon completion,
executives of both acquiring and target firms must be heavily involved in
integrating the target firm into the acquiring firm.
.............................................................................................................................................................................

At the same time, attention is diverted from other important issues. Managers in
target firms continue daily operations but rarely make long-term commitments
during the acquisition process unless they do so to avoid takeover (e.g., through
increased debt). The merger process is often described as a period of suspended
animation where long-term projects are neglected. As a result, acquisition
strategies may produce short-term perspectives and risk aversion among
managers. Managers may even use acquisitions as a substitute for innovation. A
recent study which examined 191 major acquisitions completed between 1970
and 1988, showed that after acquisitions the firms invested less in R&D than
their competition. The number of new patents also declined after acquisitions,

suggesting a lower managerial commitment to innovation.16
When acquisitions are used for proper objectives, managed effectively (e.g.,
careful integration of the acquired firm), and not as a means to avoid risk, firms'
effectiveness may be enhanced. Additionally, when acquisitions are used to
restructure the firm (e.g., to move the firm into new growth markets, enhance
efficiency, take advantage of core competencies and thus economics of scope,

etc.), firm effectiveness may also improve.
Unfortunately, many of the 1970-1980 acquisitions were not for the purpose of
restructuring. In fact, Robert Hayes, a prominent Harvard Business professor,
suggested that many firms were only interested in acquiring and divesting
business rather than growing them. "If it ain't broke, don't fix it and if it is broke,

sell it" became an operating philosophy in the 1980s, according to Hayes. 17
High Levels of Debt. Diversifying, acquisitions and leveraged buyouts have
produced higher levels of debt. Cash flows that could be used in other ways (such
as for R&D) must be used to service debt costs.
The use of leverage involves tradeoffs such as increased bankruptcy risk. While
firms may diversify to lower business risk, the use of higher levels of debt
increases financial risk. As a consequence, other risk-reducing measures are
taken such as reducing investments that have long-term potential payoffs but also
entail risk.

Innovation is risky; for example, new ventures often require approximately eight
years before becoming profitable and adequate cash flows are usually not

realized for four years thereafter.'8 A recent study found a negative relationship

between the amount of long-term debt and the amount of resources invested in
R&D. Although lead times between new products are being reduced through
computer-automated design, riskiness of new ventures is not decreasing.
Therefore, increased leverage may produce greater risk aversion which, in turn,

leads to a decreased willingness to invest in innovation. 19

The use of debt can also have positive outcomes. For example, use of debt serves
as discipline to managers to run more efficient operations. Because of the need to
have appropriate cash flow to repay the debt and interest charges, managers
must eliminate wasteful spending and create greater efficiency in firm operations.
Furthermore, Michael Jensen, a noted Harvard financial economist, argued that,
at the very least, shifting funds from wasteful practices to banks and bond holders
ensures that resources are shifted from low-return firms (and possibly industries) to
more productive ones.20
12
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Our argument, however, is that effective managers should not require debt for
discipline and efficiency. They make strategic decisions to shift resources from
poor investments to those with greater potential returns. In other words, they
create strategic competitiveness instead of having so much debt that potential
discretionary resources (e.g. cash flow) are shifted to others outside their firm for
investment.

Increasing Size. Joseph Schumpeter, an economist who focused on innovation,
hypothesized that large firms should be more innovative than smaller firms. He
reasoned that large firms are more likely to have the resources to sustain an
efficient R&D program than smaller firms. Researchers should be more productive
because of a greater number of quality colleagues with whom to interact. Larger
numbers of researchers also allow the development of greater specialization. The
argument follows that larger firms should be better able to exploit innovative
ideas. They have greater manufacturing capabilities, market power, and
resources to move innovative ideas to the market. Large firms can also assume
more risk because they usually have more slack resources than smaller firms.
Despite this logic, results of studies regarding the relationship between firm size
and production of innovation are mixed. One study found that large firms spent
almost 100 percent more on R&D per patent than smaller firms. But, small firms
utilized more of their patents than large firms, suggesting effective exploitation of
innovations. Another study found that maximum innovative output occurred at
about the sixth largest firm in the petroleum and coal industries, suggesting an
inverted U-shaped relationship between size and innovation.22 This suggests that
organizations are flexible and responsive up to some threshold size but encounter
inertia after that point. A final study found that large firms conduct a
disproportionately low amount of risky research.23

Why doesn't Schumpeter's logic hold? One explanation may be that as firms grow
larger, more formal behavioral controls are frequently instituted to decentralize
decision making authority. These bureaucratic controls produce more rigid and
standardized managerial behavior which results in inertia. A recent study showed
that larger firms had greater structural complexity and more formalization, both of

which were negatively related to new product introductions.25
Increasing Diversification. Not only have firms grown larger through acquisitive
growth, but also, until the recent restructuring (downsizing) trend, many firms
have grown more diversified. Studies on the relationship between diversification
and innovation have produced confusing results.
After controlling for a set of economic variables including industry and firm size,
two recent studies found R&D expenditures to be lower in more highly diversified
firms than less diversified firms. These researchers concluded that differences in
R&D spending were probably a result of differences in the control systems used.25
In dominant business firms, corporate executives usually do not have large spans
of control; they understand the nature of the businesses under the corporate
umbrella (because most or all are highly related to the core business). With better
strategic understanding, corporate executives can effectively evaluate the plans
and intended actions of division managers (strategic control).
Unfortunately, higher levels of diversification make it increasingly difficult for
corporate executives to use strategic controls. Their span of control is greater and,
therefore, the volume of information received is increased and becomes
overwhelming. As differences among divisions increases, executives often turn to
financial controls (e.g., ROI targets) and have less ability to determine whether
poor financial outcomes are a result of inappropriate strategy, poor
implementation, or events beyond division manager control. Therefore, emphasis
13
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on financial controls creates risk aversion and a bias on the part of divisional
managers toward short-term efficiency. This condition results in lower investment
in R&D and other innovation activities for highly diversified firms.
Another recent study found that emphasis on financial incentives for division
managers was negatively related to investment in R&D. Greater levels of
diversification and the associated control systems produced increased managerial
risk aversion. 26 Therefore, increased diversification may reduce managerial
commitment to innovation.

Another recent study
found that emphasis
on financial
incentives for division
managers was
negatively related to
investment in R&D.

Inadequate Investments in Human Capital. A special report in Business Week
concluded that the long-term neglect to human capital in the U.S. was
undermining the nation's economic future. For example, the Council on
Competitiveness evaluated current industry training programs as inadequate and
concluded that these inadequacies strongly contributed to low productivity growth
in the U.S.27 It was argued that firms have invested billions of dollars in capital
ecuipment only to learn later that there was a shortage of skilled labor to operate

it. 8Although human resources holds great competitive potential for U.S. firms,

short-term, risk-averse managerial behavior frequently leads to a reduction of
investment in employees.

As debt costs rise, other expenditures are reduced. Investments in training and
development often are the first to be pared.

In the early 1980s, Phillips Petroleum invested considerable resources in
corporate training and development. However, the firm had to take on a lot of
debt in fending off T. Boone Pickens' takeover attempt. Afterwards, despite
earlier pronouncements regarding the importance of developing a new
generation of managers, Phillips totally eliminated the corporate training and
development function. This shortsightedness can be particularly severe as the
need to implement new and more complex technologies becomes acute.

By laying off talented workers and reducing training during downturns,
competitive advantages are lost. Current rigid organizational structures
(emphasizing bureaucratic controls) do not allow full use or adequate
development of human capital. Part of the reason for inadequate development
and use of employees may relate to the evolution of organizational culture within
firms.
Poor Corporate Culture. Kilman, Saxton, and Serpa refer to corporate culture as
"the social energy that drives or fails to drive the organization.29 Most of a
firm's activities are guided by its culture. Managerial energy absorption, firm size,
and diversification all affect corporate culture. For example, as managers become
more absorbed with acquisitions, they have less time to manage the behavior of
their employees. They delegate authority but also search for better means of
controlling behavior by using formal rules and performance controls.
Compensation may be based, for instance, on specific identifiable objective
outcomes. This creates a more highly structured and less flexible culture.
Increasing size and diversification tend to reinforce these actions. As noted earlier,
increasing size often leads to greater bureaucratic controls which produce more
consistent behavior patterns but less creative expression. Financial controls
implemented in highly diversified firms produce behavioral consistency and
short-term, risk-averse behavior. Diversification also reduces cultural control (clan
14
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control) because a multi-versus mono-cultural system evolves with increasing
diversification. Thus, managerial energy absorption, large size and diversification
tend to produce corporate cultures that lower managerial commitment to
innovation.

Need to Restructure Large Diversified Firms

Strategic competitiveness problems are complex. Managerial energy absorption,
high levels of debt, large size, high levels of diversification, lack of emphasis on
human capital, and poor organizational culture are suggestive of these problems.
They lower commitment to innovation and lead to lack of technology development
which reduces a firm's ability to compete.

Although restructuring
is a useful step toward
regaining strategic

Restructuring a corporation often improves its competitiveness by reducing size
and diversification. It also creates an opportunity to focus on important
implementation issues such as employee development and an effective corporate

control. managers

culture.

must ensure
entrepreneurial
renewal as well.

Restructuring to Regain Strategic Control

Curing U.S. firms' competitiveness problem will be no simple task. The severity
and pervasiveness of the malaise will require nothing short of a major reversal of

recent trends.

Poor global performance in the 1980s has led many firms to restructure.30
Restructuring refers to rebuilding the strength of a firm through a strategic
reorientation that produces changes in asset structure and resource allocation
patterns. Restructuring efforts include downsizing and/or downscoping (reducing
diversification) and divestments and acquisitions of new businesses (if the purpose
is to develop and increase firm health by investing resources in those new
businesses). Size, debt and, most importantly, diversification reduction, should
assist managers as they attempt to regain control of their organizations.

Although restructuring is a useful step toward regaining strategic control,
managers must ensure entrepreneurial renewal as well. In fact, another Harvard
business professor, John Gabarro, argued that firms no longer want to employ old
school turnaround artists who solved problems (e.g. debt-costs) only by selling off
or closing down operations. They want a new generation manager who can cure
sick businesses by building strength rather than bleeding them dry.3'

Readjusting incentives to create longer managerial time horizons is one approach

to restructuring although Hoskisson, Hitt, and Hill found that this approach alone

does not fully reduce managerial risk aversion.32 A second approach is to reduce

the focus on entrepreneurial risk taking by restructuring the business portfolio to a
set of mature stable businesses where innovation is less necessary and use of
financial controls is appropriate. This scenario, of course, does not resolve the
strategic competitiveness problem. Finally downscoping by creating a narrower
span of control and reasserting strategic control has been used by many highly

diversified firms.

Downscoping

Selling off non-essential divisions unrelated to firms' major businesses allows
managers to regain strategic control by emphasizing firm strengths and resources.
Navistar management adeptly described this strategy: "We will grow in markets
where we can create enough advantage to earn a good return for our
shareowners. We will redeploy resources from markets where we cannot.33
Downscoping also reduces the amount of information processing required by the
CEOs enabling them to regain strategic control.
15
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During the process of downscoping, companies may also be able to reduce
leverage, which should free cash flows for use in R&D activities and human
resource development programs. For example, one study found that firms

generally increased R&D investment after downscoping. 4The decrease in
financial risk associated with debt reduction also may increase managers'
willingness to accept the risks associated with innovative activities.

During the process of
downscoping,
companies may also
be able to reduce
leverage, which
should free cash flows
for use in R&D
activities and human
resource development
programs.

Downsizing, however, may signal market retreat, possibly due to foreign
competition. We believe that the emphasis in restructuring should be on
downscoping, rather than downsizing. Recent examples of downscoping include
Marriott's divestment of restaurants, American Brands' exit from foods, General
Mills' withdrawal from retailing, and Allegis' sale of hotel and car rental
businesses.

Richard Miller's actions at Wang, after he was hired as CEO in 1989, is an
excellent example of effective restructuring. He, along with a special team of
managers, identified assets that could be sold to raise about $600 million in cash.
In so doing, $500 million in loans were paid off. However, in choosing assets for
divestiture, he protected assets that could be developed and help the firm in the
long term. For example, some managers recommended selling a small subsidiary
that provides voice mail services to other larger firms. Miller rejected that idea
because he felt that the firm would fit into Wang's long-term strategy of offering
customers information in all forms-text data, image, or voice.35

Development of Human Capital
When restructuring special emphasis should be placed on human resources.
Employees may become concerned how restructuring affects their job and future.
This concern is real since restructuring often includes a reduction in the number of
middle managers. Firms must retain their best talent. This involves evaluating

employee ability while reassuring top employees of their security and future
opportunity with the firm. Decreasing the number of managers causes greater
decentralization of authority and responsibility. Thus, employees must become
technologically proficient and able to operate autonomously. Consequently,
restructuring also creates a strong need for developing the firm's remaining
employees.

Miller, Wang's CEO,
believes that to
develop star

employees, the leader
must provide the
vision and, with this
vision, bright people

along with good ideas
will surface.

Japanese firms have long experienced success in developing employees, in the
United States and Japan. Contrary to what some experts anticipated, the Japanese
have reproduced quality manufacturing ventures in this country. The
extraordinary success of the Toyota-GM joint venture, New United Motor
Manufacturing, Inc., is an example. This venture produced as many cars with
approximately half the workers as did the previous GM plant in the same location.
Toyota's introduction of "human capital" methods among a union (UAW) work
force known for its poor work habits, directly challenges the idea that Japanese
methods are culture bound. Johnson suggested that "advanced capitalism"
emphasizes tenured employment, job rotation, on-the-job education, shallow
hierarchies of authority, and worker internalization of the enterprise.36
These are not the standard participative management techniques used by
American businesses, which assume that the happy worker is the productive
worker. Paul Gray, president of MIT, argued that U.S. firms must view employees
as a resource to be maximized rather than a cost to be minimized. Miller, Wang's
CEO, believes that to develop star employees, the leader must provide the vision
and, with this vision, bright people along with good ideals will surface. For

example, shortly after he became CEO, Miller delegated responsibility to a middle
manager to analyze Wang's global computer pricing strategy. In three short
weeks, this manager had completed his assignment. He analyzed global
competitors and their pricing structures on six continents. Furthermore, he
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identified problems and developed recommendations to solve them. For instance,
he discovered service problems and recommended that a fax machine be installed
in the CEO's office so that customers could immediately notify the CEO of service
problems. Miller said the manager acted quickly and developed creative
solutions. Miller stated, "In my book that's leadership."37
Renewed Commitment to Innovation
Revitalized R&D efforts along with a clarification of the focus of research activities
should be a part of the restructuring effort. While applied research is very
important if a firm is to develop products with commercial value, it often must be
preceded by basic research. In the last decade, little basic research has occurred
in U.S. industry outside of that commissioned by the military. Because applied
research with a base provided by basic research has a greater chance for
success, basic and applied research should be balanced.
A proper balance between product and process research and development must
also be reached. U.S. firms tend to emphasize product research while Japanese
firms emphasize process research. Japanese firms have developed new ways of
producing higher quality products while developing highly effective
manufacturing processes. Their innovations have been systematic and
incremental and have helped them produce higher quality products and thereby
gain a competitive advantage in a number of industries.

U.S. firms that invest in product and process R&D soon realize the benefits.
Several directors and top managers recommended to McKernan, CEO of Clark
Equipment, to get out of the forklift market. Instead, McKernan spent $100 million
to redesign the product and its manufacturing process. In that year the firm lost
$60 million. However, afterwards sales began to escalate, Clark's stock value
tripled, and earnings grew by 50 percent in 1989. In 1987, Quantum, a disk-drive
manufacturer, was nearly driven out of the market by innovative competitors. As
a result, the firm decided to drop its 51/4-inch disk drive business and invest in the
3?/2-inch disk drive. It had to develop and learn a completely new technology and,
therefore, formed a joint venture with a subsidiary of Matsushita which helped
Quantum revamp its manufacturing processes. Quantum engineers learned to
redesign new products twenty times instead of two. In so doing, many
manufacturing problems were prevented. Since that time, sales and profits have
increased almost 400 percent.38

Balance between basic, applied, process, and product research requires
cooperation between multiple departments within the firm. Cooperation in the
innovation process is facilitated by development of an effective organizational
culture.

Cultivation of an Effective Corporate Culture
When AT&T restructured, as required by federal mandate, it also dramatically
changed its culture. Because restructuring represents such a drastic organizational
change, it is an appropriate time to change or develop a corporate culture that
facilitates strategic competitiveness. Restructuring, which is usually induced by
external pressure, creates an opportunity for top managers to blend strategic
management with internal organizational change.
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Although the field of organizational change traditionally has focused on human,
individual, or group change through processes such as team building,

restructuring affords the opportunity for system-wide strategic change.39
Managers who have been successful in transforming a culture estimate that the
process can take from six to fifteen years.40 On the other hand, cultural
transformations such as the rapid turnaround of Chrysler Corporation and
General Electric a few years ago provide evidence that external organizational
shocks can help speed up the process.
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United Airlines has a successful corporate culture. In particular, it focuses on
building a team culture among flight crews. In so doing, the team may prevent or
correct mistakes that might be made by individual crew members. The 1982 Air
Florida airplane crash in Washington D.C. and the 1978 Eastern Airlines crash
outside of Portland were attributed to errors by individual crew members whereby
the advice of other crew members was ignored. However, in the crash of United
Flight 232 in Sioux City, 185 of the 296 people aboard survived. The remarkable
survival rate was attributed to the incredible teamwork exhibited by the crew.41
The opportunity offered by restructuring should be used to build a more effective
culture. Cultivation of an effective corporate culture includes developing an
entrepreneurial spirit, fostering a long-term and global focus, and reemphasizing
product quality.

Developing an Entrepreneurial Spiral. Much of the encouragement (or
discouragement) to pursue entrepreneurial opportunities in large firms is based on
the firm's culture. The pursuit of opportunity must be rewarded and the penalty for
failure minimized. Implementing a policy that a proposed project cannot be
blocked without approval by several levels of managers is an excellent example of
this quite the reverse of the normal procedure, where a project cannot begin
without the approval of multiple layers of management. Internal corporate
venturing departments can be established to develop new commercial products.
New product champions should be identified, supported, and rewarded. Probably
the best example of a firm known to have an entrepreneurial culture is 3M where
many employees are given a certain percent (e.g., 20 percent) of their time to
work on new ideas. The popular Post-it Note product was developed in this
innovative environment.

Kerr and Slocum recommended managing corporate culture with reward systems.
They maintain that culture represents a means of controlling employee behavior

and attitude and rewards are a way to achieve control.43 The reward system is a

visible sign of the firm's values and beliefs and may include salaries, bonuses,
promotions, or stock. If individual achievement and innovation are required,
rewards must be based on performance. Expenditures to promote innovation
might not be calculated against a managers' bonus (with some limit, of course).
This approach could be in addition to or in place of "extra" rewards for successful
innovations.

An entrepreneurial culture must promote diversity and individuality instead of
conformity. It should promote risk-taking rather than risk-averse behavior and
therefore it is imperative that rewards be based on long-term rather than
short-term performance.

Promotion of a Long-Term and Global Focus.U.S. managers must set their sights
on a global market. A recent report suggested that exports were helping many
U.S. firms maintain profitability in the face of domestic economic problems.
Furthermore, the report suggested that many U.S. firms must think globally to
survive locally.43

There is a global market for most basic products and, to expand, many U.S.
firms must compete in international markets as well as at home. For example,
the Pacific Rim provides major market opportunities for the United States. Asia
is one of the hottest markets in the world for automobiles, telecommunications
equipment, and airline seats. By the end of the 1990s the combined economies of
countries in the Pacific Rim will be larger than the European common market
and about equal to those of North America. U.S. business investments in Asia
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have already paid major returns-31.2 percent in Singapore, 28.8 percent in
Malaysia, 17.9 percent in South Korea, 23.6 percent in Hong Kong, 22.2 percent
in Taiwan and 14.1 percent in Japan. This compares well to U.S. firms'
cumulative foreign investment with an average 15.2 percent return.44
Strategies must be developed in a framework designed to maximize performance
in global markets. Providing rewards for international experience and education
along with participation in international joint ventures are just a few ways to
accomplish this goal. For example, one advantage of international joint ventures
is that they allow U.S. managers to learn and develop skills that have provided
foreign (e.g., Japanese) managers a competitive advantage.

U.S. managers must also focus on long-term strategies and break the cycle of
short-term actions. This is not a simple task because it may require some systemic
changes. First, executive incentive compensation should be based on long-term
performance. Caution must be used, however. A focus on long-term incentives
may only offset financial control problems. As shown in a recent study, the result
may be no relationship (as opposed to a negative one) between long-term
financial incentives and investment in R&D.45 Thus, incentives should be based on
the long-term performance of both the division and the firm and, to the extent
possible, strategic actions (instead of financial outcomes). This requires careful
analysis. Controls may have to be delegated to group managers (strategic
business units) where strategic controls can be more effectively applied.
Focus on High Quality Products and Service. U.S. firms need to produce and
market products comparable to the competition. High product quality must be
emphasized. Increasing process R&D investment, while emphasizing the
importance of quality can be helpful. Investments in human resource development
can also help employees be more productive (efficient) and produce higher quality
products.

To improve quality, U.S. firms must also be willing to invest capital in new plant
and equipment and develop new manufacturing technologies. For example, the
use of new process technologies (e.g., robotics) may replace routine and lower

skilled jobs. Additionally, U.S. firms may form joint ventures with European and
Japanese firms to learn how to produce higher quality products. However,
as indicated earlier, this needs to be done while nurturing the workers; a pure
investment strategy has proven unsuccessful.

Higher quality also often results from effective integration of functions in firms. For
example, initial efforts in new products design that use input from down line

functions in product production and distribution (e.g., manufacturing, testing,
marketing, service) result in lower product costs and higher product quality. For a
number of reasons, interfunctional integration is difficult to achieve; however,
firms can improve product quality and resolve a number of other problems by
achieving such integration. An effective corporate culture can promote
interfunctional integration.46
A Competitiveness Improvement Agenda
It is clear that U.S. firms have been losing the competitiveness battle to
international competition. This loss of competitiveness is partially accounted for by
economic structure and historical and cultural differences. However, these

differences may have been exaggerated and their effects lessened over time.
Therefore, as Exhibit 1 suggests, much of the current problem directly relates to
factors under managers' control. Managers, distracted with merger and
acquisition activities, have been neglecting important areas such as R&D and

employee development. Compounding the problem, increases in leverage, size,
and diversification have led to managerial risk avoidance and the increasing use
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of financial controls, each of which has produced a reduction of innovative
activities. Ineffective organizational cultures have reinforced these problems and
produced organizational inertia.

Our primary message, however, is not pessimistic. We believe that U.S. managers
can create more competitive firms and control their own fate. Competitive trends

can be reversed through decisive strategic actions. Following are summaries of
our recommendations for improving competitiveness:
* Restructure the firm to rebuild its competitive strength
- Downscope (reduce diversification)
- Divest problem businesses, make careful acquisitions (in growth markets) but
use acquisitions strategy judiciously

- Develop human capital (select and retain top talent; emphasize training and
development; manage to maximize human resources)
- Renew commitment to innovation (invest in product and process R&D; identify,
nurture and reward product champions)
* Cultivate an effective corporate culture
- Develop an entrepreneurial spirit (reward creative ideas; develop venture
departments; allow free time to work on entrepreneurial efforts; build
teamwork)

- Promote long-term and global focus (emphasize long-term performance in
executive incentive compensation; search for global market opportunities; seek
international joint ventures)
- Provide high quality products and services (invest in new plant and
equipment to improve processes; invest in human capital; reward quality;
promote interfunctional integration)

While this agenda is not a short-term solution, recent restructuring efforts by many
U.S. firms signal that managers are aware not only of the symptoms, but also of a
partial cure. There is much opportunity in the global marketplace and U.S. firms
can seize it with effective executive action.

Endnotes

This article is partly based on information
from M.A. Hitt and R.A. Hoskisson, "Strategic
Competitiveness," in L. Foster (ed.), Applied
Business Policy, Vol. 2 (Greenwich, CT: JAI
Press, 1991).
' T.A. Stewart, "Lessons from U.S. Business
Blunders," Fortune, April 23, 1990, 128; B.
Dumaine, "The New Turnaround Champs,"
Fortune, July 16, 1990, 36.
2 "Competitiveness Survey: HBR Readers
Respond," Harvard Business Review,
September/October 1987, 8-11;
"Competitiveness: 23 Leaders Speak Out,"
Harvard Business Review, July/August 1987,
106-123.
3 "Analysis of U.S. Competitiveness
Problems," America's Competitive Crisis:
Confronting the New Reality, a report by
Council on Competitiveness, April 1987, 121-126;
see also R.M. Steers and E.L. Miller,
"Management in the 1990s: The International
Challenge," Academy of Management
Executive, 2, 1988 21-22.
4 L.G. Franko, "Global Corporate
Competition: Who's Winning, Who's Losing,
and the R&D Factor as One Reason Why,"
Strategic Management Journal, 10, 1989,
449-474.

5 L.R. Klein, "Components of
Competitiveness," Science, 241, 1988, 308-312.
6 Stewart, op. cit.

7 "Japan Labor Costs Reported Near U.S.,"

Houston Chronicle, April 25, 1989, 12C; R.
Melcher and Jonathan B. Levine, "Firedl Now
Europe is Singing the White Collar Blues,"
Business Week. November 26, 1990, 70-71.
' K. Ohmae, "Americans and Japanese Save
About the Same," Wall Street Journal, June 14,
1988, 30.
9 N.J. Adler, R. Doktor. and S.G. Redding,
"From the Atlantic to the Pacific Century:
Cross-Cultural Management Reviewed," Journal
of Management, 12, 1986, 295-318.
10 M.E. Porter, Competitive Advantage:
Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance
(New York: Free Press, 1985), 320.
l J.A. Young, "Technology and
Competitiveness: A Key to the Economic Future
of the United States." Science, 241, 1988,
313-316; K. Clark, "Investment in New
Technology and Competitive Advantage," In
D.J. Teece, The Competitive Challenge:
Strategies for Industrial Innovation and
Renewal (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing
Company, 1987), 59-81; S.S. Cohen and J.
Zysman, "Manufacturing Innovation and

20

This content downloaded from 141.166.178.205 on Thu, 11 Jun 2020 11:37:29 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Hitt, Hoskisson, and Harrison

American Industrial Competitiveness," Science,
239, 1988, 1110-1115.
12 J.P. Hicks, "Lack of Spending May Doom

U.S. Steel Industry," Houston Chronicle, August
7, 1989, IB-2B.

13 E. Mansfield, "A Comparative Study of R
and D, Innovation, and Productivity Growth in
Japan and the United States: A Final Report,"

University of Pennsylvania, May 15, 1988; R.D.
Ireland, M.A. Hitt, and J. Skivington, "The
Management of R&D: Effects of Diversification

Strategy and Environment," Research
Technology Management, 33, July-August, 1990,
37-42.

14 Franko, op. cit.

15 "Patterns of Science and Technology

Resources," (Washington: National Science
Foundation, 1984, 84-311.

6 M.A. Hitt, R.E. Hoskisson, R.D. Ireland and
1.S. Harrison, "The Effects of Acquisitions on
R&D Inputs and Outputs," Academy of
Management Journal, 34, 1991, in press.
17 Stewart, op. cit., 141.
18 R. Biggadike, "The Risky Business of
Diversification," Harvard Business Review, 57,
1979, 103-111.

19 B.D. Baysinger and R.E. Hoskisson,
"Diversification Strategy and R&D Intensity in
Large Multiproduct Firms," Academy of
Management Journal, 32, 1989, 310-332; M.A.
Hitt, R.E. Hoskisson, and R.D. Ireland, "Mergers
and Acquisitions and Managerial Commitment
to Innovation in M-Form Firms," Strategic
Management Journal, Special Issue, 1990, 29-47.

' M. Jensen, "Agency Costs of Free Cash

Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers,"
American Economic Review, 76. 1986, 323-329;
M. Jensen, "Is Leverage an Invitation to
Bankruptcy," Wall Street Journal, February 1,
1989, 29.

21 J.A. Schumpeter, Theory of Economic
Development (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1961).

22 J. Schmookler, "The Size of Firm and the
Growth of Knowledge," in J. Schmookler (ed.)
Patents, Inventions, and Economic Change
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972); E.
Mansfield, Research and Innovation in the
Modern Corporation (New York: Norton, 1971).
23 E. Mansfield, "Composition of R&D
Expenditures, Relationship to Size of Firm,
Concentration and Innovative Output," Review
of Economics and Statistics, 63, 1983, 610-615.

24 J.E. Ettlie, W.P. Bridges, and R.D. O'Keefe,
"Organization Strategy and Structural
Differences for Radical Versus Incremental
Innovation," Management Science, 30, 1984,
682-695.

25 R.E. Hoskisson and M.A. Hitt, "Strategic
Control and Relative R&D Investment in Large
Multiproduct Firms," Strategic Management
Journal, 9, 1988, 605-621; Baysinger and
Hoskisson, op. cit.

"Managerial Incentives and Investment in R&D

in Large Multiproduct Firms," Texas A&M
University, working paper, 1990.
27 K. Pennar, "It's Time to Put Our Money
Where Our Future Is," Business Week
September 19, 1988, 140-141; "Analysis of U.S.
Competitiveness Problems," op. cit.
28 B. Nussbaum, "Needed: Human Capital,"
Business Week, September 19, 1988, 100-102.
29 R.H. Kilmann, M.J. Saxton, and R. Serpa,
"Issues in Understanding and Changing
Culture," California Management Review, 27,
1986, 87-94.

3 D.J. Ravenscraft and F.M. Scherer, Mergers,
Sell-Offs and Economic Efficiency (Washington,
D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1987).
31 B. Dumaine, op. cit.
32 R.E. Hoskisson, M.A. Hitt, and C.W.L. Hill,
"Managerial Risk Aversion in Diversified Firms:
An Evolutionary Perspective," Organization
Science, 1991, in press.
3 C. Borucki and C.K. Barnett, "Restructuring
for Self-Renewal: Navistar International

Corporation," Academy of Management
Executive, 4, 1990. 45.
34 R.E. Hoskisson and R.A. Johnson,
"Restructuring and R&D Intensity," Texas A&M
University, working paper, 1990.

35 Dumaine, op. cit., 38.
3 C. Johnson, "Japanese-Style Management
in America," California Management Review.
30, 1988, 34-45.

37 Stewart, op. cit.: 129; Dumaine, op. cit.,
39-40.

38 Dumaine, op. cit., 42.
39 R.A. Johnson, R.E. Hoskisson and N.
Margulies, "Corporate Restructuring:
Implications for Organizational Change and
Development." In R.W. Woodman and W.A.
Pasmore (eds.); Research in Organizational
Change and Development, Vol. 4, 141-166
(Greenwich, CT, JAI, 1990).
40 "Corporate Culture Vultures," Fortune,
October 17, 1983, 66-73.
41 J. Valentine and B. O'Brien, "Airline
Cockpits Are No Place to Solo" Wall Street
Journal, August 2, 1989, B-1.

42 J. Kerr and J.W. Slocum, "Managing

Corporate Culture Through Reward Systems,"
Academy of Management Executive, 1, 1987,
99-107.

43 M. McNamee, P. Magnusson, A. Fins, and
R. King, "Think Globally, Survive Locally,"
Business Week, November 26, 1990, 50-51.
44 L. Kraar, "The Rising Power of the Pacific,"
Fortune, Fall 1990, 8-12.
5 Hoskisson et al, 1989, op. cit.
46 W.J. Spencer, "Research to Product: A
Major U.S. Challenge," California Management
Review, 32, 1990, 45-53; W.E. Souder and V.
Padmanabhan, "Transferring New Technologies
from R&D to Manufacturing,"
Research-Technology Management, 32, 1989,

26 R.E. Hoskisson, M.A. Hitt, and C.W.L. Hill,38-43.

About the Authors Michael A. Hitt is the T.J. Barlow professor of Business Administration at Texas
A&M University. He formerly served on the faculties of Oklahoma State
University and University of Texas at Arlington. He has held administrative

21

This content downloaded from 141.166.178.205 on Thu, 11 Jun 2020 11:37:29 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Academy of Management Executive

positions at each of those universities and management positions at Samsonite
Corporation. In addition, he has served as a consultant to over 35 corporations
and public organizations. He has authored or coauthored eight books and a

number of articles in such journals as the Academy of Management Journal,
Journal of Applied Psychology, Academy of Management Executive, Strategic
Management Journal, Journal of Management, and Organization Science,
among others. He has served on the editorial review board of the Academy of
Management Journal, Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, The Executive, and
Journal of High Technology Management. Currently he is the editor of the
Academy of Management Journal. His current research interests include the
effects of acquisitions and strategic refocusing on innovation, transnational
strategic decision making, and the outcomes of global diversification.

Robert E. Hoskisson received his PhD at the University of California, Irvine and
is currently an associate professor of Management at Texas A&M University. He
has authored or coauthored articles in such journals as Academy of
Management Journal, Academy of Management Review, Strategic Management
Journal, Journal of Management, and Academy of Management Executive. He
teaches courses in strategic management at the undergraduate and graduate
levels and his research focuses on how to manage global diversified firms. He is
also interested in innovation and governance structures of large publicly held
firms. He is very active in the Academy of Management and Strategic
Management Society. Professor Hoskisson serves on several editorial review
boards including the Academy of Management Journal, Journal of Management,
and Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice. He was recently honored by his
colleagues in the College of Business Administration at Texas A&M University
in receiving a fellowship for outstanding research contribution.

Jeffrey S. Harrison received his PhD in strategic management from the
University of Utah and is currently an assistant professor in the Department of
Management at Clemson University. He is active in a variety of roles in the
Academy of Management, Strategic Management Society, and the Southem
Management Association. Professor Harrison's research and consulting interests
include mergers and acquisitions, corporate restructuring, vertical integration,
organizational effectiveness, and strategic human resources management.

22

This content downloaded from 141.166.178.205 on Thu, 11 Jun 2020 11:37:29 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

